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Proposition 8 and the Need for California
Constitutional Amendment Initiative Reform:
Tolerance Requires Time and Deliberation
by ANGELA CHRYSLER*
Introduction
Proposition 8, a California ballot proposition entitled,
"Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry," passed on
November 4, 2008 and amended the California Constitution to read:
"only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California."' Previous attempts to prohibit same-sex marriage were
statutory in form: In 1977, the legislature defined marriage between a
man and a woman in California Family Code section 3002 and in 2000,
the electorate passed Proposition 22 with sixty-one percent of the
vote and added section 308.5 to the California Family Code to ensure
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1. California General Election Guide, Official Voter Information Guide (Nov. 4,
2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/prop8-title-
sum.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009); California General Election Guide, Text of Proposed
Laws (Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-
proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop8 (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
2. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300-310 (West 2004).
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there were no loopholes for same-sex marriage Proposition 8
overruled the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage
Cases, which stated:
[T]he right to marry, as embodied in article I, sections 1 and 7
of the California Constitution, guarantees same-sex couples the
same substantive constitutional rights as opposite-sex couples to
choose one's life partner and enter with that person into a
committed, officially recognized, and protected family
relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally based
incidents of marriage.
In that case, the court declared that the ability to marry one's
choice of life partner is a fundamental right under the California
Constitution and thus protected the rights of a minority of the
population and overruled the majority who had voted for Proposition
22.' The ACLU filed a suit claiming Proposition 8 was a
constitutional revision and not an amendment and should be deemed
invalid by the California Supreme Court.6  But the California
Supreme Court deferred to the electorate and upheld Proposition 8 in
Strauss v. Horton.7 The legality of same-sex marriage became a game
of tug of war between the court and the electorate and the electorate
prevailed.
Procedurally, initiatives, like Proposition 8, amend the California
State Constitution without deliberation or compromise.' The
California courts are the only institutional check and protector of
minority rights in California's direct democracy scheme. The courts'
indispensable role as protector of individual and minority rights
places the court in a precarious position. Many view judicial review
of direct democracy as a more acute counter-majoritarian act because
3. California Primary Election Guide, Limit on Marriages, Initiative Statute,
Proposition 22 (Mar. 7, 2000), available at http://primary2OOO.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/
Propositions/22text.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
4. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 829 (Cal. 2008).
5. Id.
6. Legal Groups File Lawsuit Challenging Proposition 8, Should it Pass, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/relationships
/37706prs20081105.html.
7. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 474-75 (Cal. 2009).
8. LARRY J. SABATO ET AL., DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BATTLE OVER
BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 53 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2001).
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it does not overrule another branch of government, but the people
themselves.9
The tension between the electorate and the court created by the
initiative system may leave justices facing increased public
resentment, possible campaigns to oust them from office, and "the
courts' legitimacy, independence, and capacity to protect minority
rights may erode."1° In state courts where judges are elected rather
than appointed, the electorate can express its disfavor of a judge's
decision and essentially vote him or her out of office.1 Although a
judge should focus on interpreting the law and not his or her
retention on the bench, he or she is human. As former California
Supreme Court Justice Grodin explains, "the potential that the
pendency or threat of a judicial election is likely to have for distorting
the proper exercise of the judicial function is substantial, and
palpable."'2 If the courts lose their ability to review initiatives without
fear of backlash from the public, then initiatives will essentially
become unchecked vehicles of the majority will. 3 I will argue that
under the current California initiative system: 1) Proposition 8 is an
example of the initiative system placing the California Supreme Court
in a vulnerable position via the electorate; 2) the initiative system,
which was instituted during the Progressive Era at the turn of the
twentieth century, has not fulfilled its intended purpose of promoting
democracy and confounding special interest, but rather the initial
fears of some of the progressives have materialized; 3) the structure
of the initiative process, which only allows for judicial review, should
be reformed to avoid both the pressure on the courts and negative
effects on minority groups; 4) reform is more critical for
constitutional amendment initiatives than for statutory initiatives; 5)
the State Constitution should be amended through a more
deliberative process involving the State Legislature and take into
9. Id. at 54.
10. Id. at 59.
11. Id. at 58; see also ERIN ADRIAN, WOMEN'S LEGAL HISTORY STANFORD, ROSE
ELIZABETH BIRD: CHOOSING To BE JUST 26 (2002), http://womenslegalhistory.
stanford.edu/papers/BirdR-Adrian02.pdf (In 1986, Rose Bird, Cruz Reynoso, and Joseph
Grodin were voted off the bench due to their opposition to the death penalty. Their
"defeat changed law, politics, and the judiciary in California forever. 'The defeat of Rose
Bird was significant because it created a new danger in this state, the danger of politicizing
a judicial branch that had not previously been subject to political pressures,' said Court of
Appeal Justice J. Anthony Kline, who served with Bird in Gov. Brown's administration.").
12. SABATO, supra note 8, at 58-59.
13. See id. at 59.
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account more than a simple majority of the electorate; 6) reformers
should look at other systems, like Switzerland and Massachusetts, to
incorporate institutional review of potential initiatives.
I. Case Study: Proposition 8
The California Supreme Court is often a leading voice in the
country for individual rights and freedom: "As California goes, so
goes the rest of the nation., 14 Marriage rights are no exception. In
1948, the California Supreme Court was the first court in the nation
to strike down a state law prohibiting interracial marriage.15 In Perez
v. Sharp, the Court noted that marriage "is a fundamental right of
free men," and held "the right to marry is the right to join in marriage
with the person of one's choice.' 16 The In re Marriage Cases Court
expanded on Perez's notion that the right to marry is a fundamental
constitutional right embedded in the California Constitution:
[T]he constitutionally based right to marry properly must be
understood to encompass the core set of basic substantive legal
rights and attributes traditionally associated with marriage that
are so integral to an individual's liberty and personal autonomy
that they may not be eliminated or abrogated by the Legislature
or by the electorate through the statutory initiative process."
Therefore, the In re Marriage Cases court determined that the
right to marry, as embodied in the California Constitution article 1,
sections 1 and 7, guaranteed same-sex couples the same substantive
constitutional rights as heterosexual couples, including the right to
choose one's life partner.18 The emphasis on choice is similar to the
language of Perez. The In re Marriage Cases court held that the
statutes (enacted by Proposition 22 and the Legislature in 1977)
violated California's Equal Protection clause, and that "a more
exacting and rigorous standard of review-'strict scrutiny'-is applied
when the distinction drawn by a statute rests upon a so-called 'suspect
14. News Bites: "As California Goes, So Does the Rest of the Nation, " QUEERCENTS,
May 16, 2008, http://www.queercents.com/wordpress/2008/05/16/newsbitese2%80%9cas-
california-goes-so-does-the-nation %e2%80%9d/.
15. See Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (Cal. 1948).
16. Id. at 714-15.
17. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 781 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 781-82.
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classification' or impinges upon a fundamental right." 19 Therefore,
both Perez and In re Marriage Cases held that restricting the ability of
people to choose who they marry violates "a basic civil or human
right of all people." 20
Proposition 8 essentially overruled the California Supreme Court
by changing the language of the California Constitution, passing with
52.46% of the vote to 47.54% in opposition.2' A four percent
difference in support stripped a right from a minority group deemed
fundamental by the California Supreme Court less than six months
prior to the election. The ACLU claimed that Proposition 8 should
be invalid because it was a revision of the Constitution and not just an
amendment: "A major purpose of the constitution is to protect
minorities from majorities. Because changing that principle is a
fundamental change to the organizing principles of the constitution
itself, only the legislature can initiate such revisions to the
constitution. ' Proposition 8 placed a measure the court already held
invalid as a statute and presented the same text as a constitutional
amendment. Proponents of Proposition 8 were able to bypass judicial
review by amending the state constitution with a simple majority of
the electorate.
The passage of Proposition 8 ignited a series of protests across
California from members of the gay community and supporters of
same-sex marriage.23 Democratic state legislators filed amicus curiae
brief in support of the challenge to the passage of Proposition 8.24
Governor Schwarzenegger did not join the democratic legislators in
challenging Proposition 8, but he suggested the court ruled
appropriately in In re Marriage Cases by comparing the decision with
Perez, and stating that the court should resolve the issue in favor of
legalizing same-sex marriages.5 Proponents of Proposition 8 claimed
19. Id. at 783.
20. Id. at 819, n.41.
21. Maloy Moore & Megan Garvey, Gay Marriage Ban: A Tale of Two Votes, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/politics/calla2008
electionprop8prop22,0,6153805.htmlstory.
22. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 6.
23. Jessica Garrison & Corina Knoll, Prop. 8 Opponents Rally Across California to
Protest Gay-Marriage Ban, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/california/la-meprop8l62008novl6,0,913064.story.
24. Kevin Yamamura, Schwarzenegger Suggests Court Should Block Prop. 8,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 17, 2008, at 3A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/capitoland
california/story/1403231.html.
25. Id.
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that the challenge would subvert the will of the people and render the
ability of initiatives to amend the constitution moot.26 Proponents
argued that Proposition 8 is a single subject initiative that restores the
definition of marriage to what it was and always had been prior to In
re Marriages Cases.27 The initiative system placed the court in the
center of a public controversy.'
The California Supreme Court deemed Proposition 8 a
permissible constitutional amendment and not a constitutional
revision in Strauss v. Horton.29  Although the California Supreme
Court in In re Marriages Cases deemed that the same-sex marriage
ban violated the state constitution's equal protection clause, in Strauss
the court held Proposition 8 "carves out a narrow and limited
exception to these state constitutional rights, reserving the official
designation of the term 'marriage' for the union of opposite-sex
couples" but leaves "undisturbed all of the other extremely significant
substantive aspects of a same-sex couple's state constitutional right to
establish an officially recognized and protected family relationship
and the guarantee of equal protection of the laws."'
In Strauss, the California Supreme Court stated, "the principal
issue before us concerns the scope of the right of the people, under the
provisions of the California Constitution, to change or alter the state
Constitution itself through the initiative process so as to incorporate
such a limitation as an explicit section of the state Constitution.31
Recognizing that the California constitutional amendment process is
less demanding and differs greatly from the federal constitutional
amendment process, the court noted "a difference dramatically
demonstrated by the circumstance that only 27 amendments to the
United States Constitution have been adopted since the federal
Constitution was ratified in 1788, whereas more than 500
amendments to the California Constitution have been adopted since
26. Mike McKee, Supreme Court Wants More Briefs on Prop. 8, LEGAL PAD, Nov.
12, 2008, http://legalpad.typepad.com/my weblog/2008/ll/looks-like-supremes-will-hear-
prop-8-cases.html.
27. Why Proposition 8, Protect Marriage.com, http://www.protectmarriage.com
/about/why (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
28. Bob Egelko, Prop 8 Hinges on Who Decides: Judges or Voters, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Nov. 19, 2008, at B-i, available at http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/11/
19/BAAV147103.DTL.
29. Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 474-75.
30. Id. at 388.
31. Id. at 385 (emphasis in original).
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ratification of California's current Constitution in 1879. "32 The
California amendment process is subject to majoritarian whims and as
a result, the California Constitution is amended frequently.
David Boies and Theodore B. Olson have filed a federal suit on
behalf of two gay couples arguing, among other things, that
Proposition 8 violates federal constitutional guarantees of equal
protection and due process.3 The timing of the federal suit is
controversial because of the conservative nature of the current
Supreme Court; however, Boies and Olson are confident that "that
the makeup of the Supreme Court [is] right because of the presence
of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy" and they "point[] to two cases in
which gay rights groups prevailed-a sodomy case in Texas and a
constitutional ban on local antidiscrimination laws in Colorado-in
which Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion." 34 Critics of the
federal suit counter, among other things, that the suit is premature
because the United States Supreme Court usually reflects public
opinion and/or the law in the majority of the states. Although the
Court issued a strong gay-rights decision with Lawrence v. Texas,
which struck down laws against intimacy for gay couples, it explicitly
noted that it was not ruling on the formal legal recognition of same-
sex relationships. 36 Therefore, critics of filing a federal suit believe
there is more proponents can do at the state level, such as educate the
public about same-sex marriage rights, win some initiative campaigns,
or simply let some of the victories settle in so people witness that
same-sex marriage does not impact other groups except same-sex
couples.37
Same-sex marriage proponents face a difficult road if they seek
to place another initiative on the ballot. After the Strauss decision,
"one of [California's] largest gay rights groups, Equality California,
sent an e-mail message to supporters pleading for contributions to
raise $500,000 toward 'a massive campaign to put an initiative on the
32. Id. at 386.
33. Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2009, at Al, available at httpl/www.nytimes.com2009/05/28/usi28marriage.html?ref=politics.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also Joe Garafoli, Gay Rights Advocates Rip to Undo Prop. 8, S.F.
CHRONICLE, May 28, 2009, at A-10, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?
f=/c/a/2009/05/27/MNDC17SB47.DTL&type=politics&tsp=l.
36. Id.; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
37. Id.
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ballot and win."'38 In addition to the expense of another initiative
campaign, same-sex proponents must run a campaign to heighten
awareness for the plight of same-sex couples to all socio-economic
groups in California if they want to win the electorate.39
II. California History of the Initiative and
the Progressive Movement
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Southern Pacific
Railroad was entrenched in all levels of California government., ° The
company's influence and power was described in Frank Norris' novel
The Octopus: "They own us... they own our homes; they own our
legislatures .... We are told we can defeat them at the ballot box.
They own the ballot box. We are told we must look to the courts for
redress; they own our courts."'" The purpose of the initiative was to
provide the public with a way to overcome special interest like the
Southern Pacific Railroad by directly intervening in the legislative
process when the state legislature was unresponsive to public
42
concerns.
The development and adoption of direct democracy in California
was largely due to the progressive movement led by John Randolph
38. John Schwartz, California High Court Upholds Gay Marriage Ban; N.Y. TIMES,
May 26,2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/27marriage.html. see also Richard
Kim, California Supreme Court Upholds Prop. 8, THE NATION, May 26, 2009,
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/notion/438620 ("But the decision on whether or not to
sink massive dollars and resources into an initiative to reverse Prop 8 in 2010 (remember,
Prop 8 was the second most expensive election in the country in 2008; only the presidency
cost more), should take this relative equality into account. There are dozens of states
where same-sex couples have no partnership rights whatsoever; states where it is still legal
to fire someone because they are gay; a federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act is
still stalled in Congress.").
39. Ben Ehrenreich, Anatomy of a Failed Campaign, THE ADVOCATE, November 19,
2008, http://www.advocate.com/print-article-ektid66063.asp ("[E]xit polls indicated that
Latinos voted in favor of Prop. 8 by 53%to 47%, and an exit poll stated 70% of African-
Americans voted for it. (Whites split right down the middle.)").
40. RICHARD J. ELLIS , DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN
AMERICA 187 (Univ. Press of Kan. 2002); see also CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT 36 (2d ed. 2008) (The Southern Pacific Railroad "and its followers not only
monopolized the economy of California but also heavily entrenched themselves at all
levels of government. Towns and cities found themselves obligated to railway lines for
survival and hence to the Southern Pacific. It was no secret that the Southern Pacific
virtually owned California's state government.").
41. ELLIS, supra note 40, at 187.
42. JOHN M. ALLSWANG, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 1
(Stanford Univ. Press 2000).
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Haynes, a wealthy Los Angeles doctor and businessman who was
very active in local politics. 3 Middle-and upper-class citizens who
believed that the strengthening of the people and weakening of
politicians would result in better government advocated for direct
legislation, which became popular at both the city and state level.
4
Haynes took up the direct legislation cause. Haynes described direct
democracy:
Let me confess it gentlemen, democracy is part of my religion ....
We find that happiness, enlightment [sic] and propserty [sic]
among the people increase in precisely the same ration as do
their power, influence, and participation in government.
Responsibility tends to develop the best that is in us.
To progressives, and Haynes particularly, direct legislation was a
structural improvement on representative government, which
expanded democracy by allocating more power to the people.46 With
this new power and responsibility, the people would fight and
confound special interest.47 In addition, it was a moral improvement
based on "the assumption that the rule of 'the people' was the noblest
aim of democracy, and that these political devices [the initiative and
referendum] were a path to fulfilling that ideal., 48  After the
successful implementation of initiatives and referendums at the local
Los Angeles city level and with Haynes' political and monetary
support, Hiram Johnson promised Haynes it would be part of his
41platform as governor.
In the 1910 election, the Progressives won the governorship with
Hiram Johnson and also won control of both the state senate and
assembly." Johnson stated he would enact the direct democracy
measures in his inaugural address.5 In 1911, the legislature passed
twenty-three constitutional amendments, which included direct
democracy, women's suffrage, railroad regulation, and workmen's
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 30-31.
49. Id. at 15.
50. CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 40, at 40.
51. See ALLSWANG, supra note 42, at 15.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
compensation, that were then collectively referred to the electorate
for a vote. 2 Ironically, "[a]lmost at a single stroke the legislature had
reshaped the contours of California politics without any assistance
from the statewide initiative."53 The legislature continued to adopt
progressive reform throughout the 1910s. For example, the
legislature reformed labor law by passing a series of acts that created
an eight-hour work day for women, restricted child labor, required
employers not to withhold wages for longer than fifteen days, and
established an Industrial Accident Board.4 Unlike the legislature,
initiatives had little success reforming labor relations. Initiatives to
create an eight-hour day and forty-hour work week for all failed and
no initiatives passed dealing with the Southern Pacific Railroad or
55any other corporate power.
From the start, initiatives with some social or cultural
characteristic tended to draw the largest number of voters. 6 In 1914,
ninety-one percent of the electorate voted on Prohibition measure 2,
and seventy-seven percent "voted on prize fights and on the anti-
prostitution referendum."57  Moreover, voter agreement and
ideological consistency on many of these social issues was strong and
persistent over time. Thus, groups of voters who supported
conservative social agendas tended to represent a consistent voting
block, giving them the power to target offensive social behavior.
Although the California's Progressive Era is often deemed by
many as the golden era of direct democracy reform, many of these
reforms were simply acts passed by the legislature and not by the
people. 9 Despite the lofty goals of fighting the Southern Pacific,
expanding democracy to the people, and checking an unresponsive
legislature, in practice California's direct democracy focused more on
social and moral issues rather than combating entrenched interest
groups.6° In fact, there were many early critics from the Progressive
52. Id. at 17; see also ELLIS, supra note 40, at 187.
53. ELLIS, supra note 40, at 187.
54. Id. at 188.
55. Id.
56. ALLSWANG, supra note 42, at 19.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id.
59. See ELLIS, supra note 40, at 187.
60. See ALLSWANG, supra note 42, at 20; see also CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, supra note 40, at 42-43 ("Instead, early initiatives focused on taxation,
prohibition, gambling, bond measures and similar concerns.").
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movement who were worried about the potential effects of direct
democracy and who foreshadowed some of the problems California
faces today.6' Chester Rowell, who felt the initiatives had been
abused at the local level and the reality would be worse at the state
level, stated that the initiative is "'the worst possible way' to deal with
complex questions., 62  Harris Weinstock believed in expanding
democracy but worried that the initiative would "promote radical
legislation." 63  Edward Dickson feared that interest groups would
become too influential and was especially concerned that these
groups would recall judges who did not favor their policies.64 Should
the progressives have listened more to these critics? These critics
highlight that progressives were concerned about the majority of the
electorate enacting policies without deliberation and with the ability
to pressure the judiciary if it was not compliant with the electorate's
policies.
From the perspective of same-sex marriage supporters,
California experienced some of the progressives' foreshadowed fears
of the structure of the initiative process with Proposition 8: a well
organized interest group, focused on a social issue, passed a
constitutional amendment without deliberation or time to reflect, and
stripped a minority group of a right deemed fundamental by
California Supreme Court.
III. California Constitution: Structure of the Initiative Process
Article 2, section 8 of the California Constitution provides the
electorate, through the vehicle of the initiative, with the power to
both propose statutes and constitutional amendments and to adopt or
reject them.65 In order for an initiative to make it to the ballot, the
measure is presented to the Secretary of State in the form of a
petition which states the text of the proposed statute or amendment.66
The measure must be signed by five percent of electors for a statute
and eight percent of electors for an amendment to the Constitution of
the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial
election. Currently, the approximate number of signatures needed
61. See ALLSWANG, supra note 42, at 14.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
66. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
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for a statute is around 375,000 and the approximate number for an
amendment is 600,000.67
Once the signatures are gathered, the Secretary of State is
required to wait 131 days before placing the proposition on the
ballot.' The state constitution imposes three limitations on
initiatives: an initiative must be a single subject or it has no effect, an
initiative cannot exclude any political subdivision of the state from
the application or effect of its provisions, and an initiative cannot
contain alternative or cumulative provisions.69 If a measure passes
with a simple majority vote of the electorate, the legislature can
amend or repeal an initiative statute only if the electorate approves
the legislature's proposed alternative statute, unless the initiative
explicitly permits the legislature to amend or repeal the statute
without the electorate's approval.70 Moreover, the governor may not
veto an initiative unless explicitly allowed in the language of the
proposition.7 Therefore, the electorate can pass statutes or amend
the constitution with little interference from elected officials; the only
branch of government that has the ability-to-check the initiative
process is the judicial branch.
IV. Lack of Checks and Balances in the Initiative Process:
The Role of the Courts
Should laws enacted by the people with a simple majority vote
through the initiative process be treated the same or differently than
laws enacted through the legislative process? A person's response
depends on whether they inherently trust or distrust the
representative government system.72 Does he or she feel like
politicians represent the public needs, or are politicians motivated
more by personal ambition? In general, Americans are skeptical of
government and often believe "[t]he checks and balances, so
necessary to control the avarice and ambition of politicians, are not
needed when the will of the people can be directly expressed. And if
the people do error on occasion, the courts are there to prevent them
67. E. DOTSON WILSON & BRIAN S. EBBERT, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 39 (Office
of the Chief Clerk of the Assembly 2006) (calculating from the 2002 state-wide election results).
68. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(c).
69. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d)-(f).
70. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
71. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10.
72. See ELLIS, supra note 40, at 125-26.
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from doing away with fundamental rights. 73 While no state court is
required to give greater deference to an initiative than a statute
passed by the legislature, often judges, particularly those who are
subject to recall, tend to treat voter approved initiatives with greater
deference.74 Thus, there is an inherent conflict within the initiative
structure: courts are relied upon to prevent the majority from
infringing on individual rights, yet judges tend to give greater
deference to initiatives passed by the people.
There are contrasting theories as to how judges should handle
their potentially counter-majoritarian task of ruling on initiatives.
Judges, who adopt the Populist view, "that in exercising their judicial
review, courts should give extraordinary deference to initiatives,
because initiatives represent the 'pure' will of the people, and the will
of the people is entitled to great respect," are called Juris-Populists.75
United States Supreme Court Justice Black, a Juris-Populist,
"asserted that the initiative process was 'as near to a democracy as
you can get' and that a challenge to a law has less force if the law is
enacted by the people directly than if it were enacted by the
legislature."76 Justice Scalia, a current United States Supreme Court
Justice, also promotes juris-populist notions.77 Scalia dissented in
Romer v. Evans, which overturned a Colorado voter-approved state-
wide initiative prohibiting homosexuals from claiming rights as a
protected class, and stated:
[The initiative] put directly to all the citizens of the state, the
question: Should homosexuality be given special protection?
They answered no. The court today asserts that this most
democratic of procedures in unconstitutional .... Striking [the
initiative] down is an act, not of judicial judgment, but of
political will.'
Some justices on the Supreme Court of California, such as
Justice Richardson and Justice Bird, have similar inclinations and
views; they wrote that initiatives are entitled to "very special and very
73. Id. at 125.
74. Id. at 126.
75. SABATO, supra note 8, at 54.
76. Id at 54 (quoting Black, J., in oral argument in Reitman v. Malkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)).
77. Id. at 55.
78. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting); see also SABATO,
supra note 8, at 55.
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favored treatment" when reviewed and that "it is our solemn duty to
jealously guard the initiative process, it being 'one of our most
precious rights.... .",9 Both United States and California Supreme
Court justices present compelling arguments in favor of letting the
people have the ultimate decision on policy measures; however, in
practice initiatives amount to unfiltered majority rule.
The critics of Juris-Populists and direct democracy argue that the
initiative process runs counter to the representative and republican
system laid out in the United States Constitution.' In Federalist No.
10, James Madison worried about the interest of factions."1 Madison
claimed if factions were under a popular government they would lead
to instability and injustice; unchecked majority rule may become
majority tyranny.82 In a representative system, there are many checks
on majority rule and points in the process for deliberation, such as the
principle of separation of powers, supermajority votes within the
legislature, bicameralism, and the President's veto; whereas, the
courts in California are the initiatives' first and last check.83
Moreover, under a system of separation of powers courts tend to
defer to the policy making judgments of the legislature. 84 Legislatures
are better equipped to deal with intricacies of national policies: They
have better investigative powers and can deliberate the various merits
79. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 33 (Cal. 1983) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting); Amador Valley Joint High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1302 (Cal. 1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Associated Home
Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc., v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976); see
also SABATO, supra note 8, at 55.
80. Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, "And to the Republic for Which It
Stands": Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1057, 1059 (1996) (discussing that the idea that state initiatives violate the Guarantee
clause stems from Madison's Federalist No. 10); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison).
81. See ELLIS, supra note 40, at 123; see also Rogers & Faigman, supra note 80, at
1059-60.
82. ELLIS, supra note 40, at 123.
83. Rogers & Faigman, supra note 80, at 1060 ("Madison proposed the republican
form as a check on the passions of a potentially factious majority. Representative decision
making offered a mechanism by which public views could be refined and enlarged. In a
republic, Madison believed, 'the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority'
could be tempered by the reasoned judgment of representatives acting for the common
good.") (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10).
84. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1534
(1990) ("When a Federal court declares an act of the Congress unconstitutional, it
encroaches on the authority of a coordinate and equal branch of government to make law,
a power that Article I explicitly confers upon the legislative branch. This disturbs the
constitutional division of powers, and courts are urged to do so sparingly.").
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of policy positions." Essentially, legislatures have institutional
advantages over courts in making policy; however, initiatives do not
go through the same process as laws enacted by the legislature.86 This
difference in procedure and process tilts in favor of stricter judicial
review of initiatives than of laws passed through the legislature.'
Judges who are more skeptical of initiatives tend to believe in the
above criticisms and are called Progressive-Oriented "Initiative
Watchdogs." '8  They argue that judges should not give initiatives
special deference. 9 In Brosnahan v. Brown, Justice Bird dissented
and articulated the flaws of initiatives, arguing that initiatives are
"drafted only by their proponents... [and] there is no opportunity
for compromise or negotiation. 'The result of this inflexibility is that
more often than not a proposed initiative represents the most
extreme form of the law that is considered politically expedient."'
Judges who are more skeptical of initiatives run the risk of public
backlash. Justice Bird, Justice Grodin, and Justice Reynoso were all
voted out of their positions on the California Supreme Court when a
public campaign was launched against them for their decisions against
capital punishment.91
The debate surrounding judicial review continues to become
more intense. In 1992, the California Commission on Campaign
Financing argued in its report on the California initiative industry
"that there had been a shift of power between the state legislature
and the electorate and that increasingly, most important policy
decisions are made in initiative elections. ' '92 In addition, since 1960
about two-thirds of successful initiatives have been challenged in
court and in more than half of these challenges, the initiative was
85. See Rogers & Faigman, supra note 80, at 1063 ("No one could seriously contend
that complex problems are better solved in the absence of discussion and debate. And no
matter how creative the suggestions from defenders of pure democracy, the simple truth is
that representative lawmaking includes, as part of its process, formal deliberation and
debate. The state initiative process does not.").
86. See id.
87. See SABATO, supra note 8, at 55.
88. Id. at 56.
89. Id.
90. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 292 (Cal. 1982) (Bird, C.J. dissenting); see also
SABATO, supra note 8, at 56.
91. Robert Lindsey, Deukmejian and Cranston Win As 3 Judges Are Ousted, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6,1986, at A30.
92. SHAUN BOWLER ET AL., CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES 109 (Ohio State Univ. Press 1998).
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struck down completely or in part.93  With no other check on
initiatives, courts face resolving contentious issues, like same-sex
marriage. The controversy surrounding Proposition 8 supports the
conclusion that the initiative process is contentious and places the
court in an insecure position vis-A-vis the electorate. For example, the
title of an article in the San Francisco Chronicle read, "Proposition 8
Hinges on who decides: Judges or Voters." 94 Therefore, the initiative
structure requires courts to invalidate initiatives in the eyes of the
public, creating tension between courts and the electorate. 95 This
structure raises the concern that when the court experiences pressure
from the electorate, it may not be able or willing to function in its
traditional role of protector of minority rights.
V. The Initiative Process and Minority Rights
A direct initiative is a form of lawmaking by majority rule.96 A
majority interest can propose, qualify, and pass legislation without
regard to the interest, preferences, or demands of others. 97 The
initiative process, in theory, "allows even a fleeting majority of
citizens, in the secrecy and anonymity of the voting booth, to enact a
law that adversely affects an unpopular minority." 98 Initiatives, like
Proposition 8, that amend state constitutions with a simple majority
are particularly troublesome when compared with the requirements
to amend the United States Constitution: a two-thirds vote of both
houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states.99
These additional hurdles reflect a belief that constitutions should
have widespread public support and, unlike statutes, should not be
amended hastily.00 "Each of these departures from majority rule
reflects the nation's historical commitment to safeguarding minority
rights and interests, as well as promoting democratic deliberation and
93. ELLIS, supra note 40, at 148.
94. Egelko, supra note 28, at B-1.
95. See SABATO, supra note 8, at 60.
96. Eule, supra note 84, at 1510 ("In order to exercise this option the voters neither
need legislative permission nor legislative assistance. A measure may be placed on the
ballot by securing a specified number of signatures-usually set at some percentage of the
votes cast in the preceding general election-and the measure is enacted if a majority of
the voters signify their approval.").
97. Id.
98. SABATO, supra note 8, at 50.
99. See ELLIS, supra note 40, at 123.
100. Id.
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good public policy."'' Contrary to our national philosophy,
Proposition 8, and constitutional amendment initiatives in general,
contradict the idea that an amendment to a constitution should have
deep public support and be subjected to a deliberative process; rather,
Proposition 8 passed with a small majority of the vote and took away
rights of an unpopular minority.
Proposition 8 is an example of the majority taking away rights
established by the judiciary; however, initiatives also can overrule the
legislature. Kenneth Miller's recent study of California, Colorado,
and Oregon over the last forty years discovered that voters in these
states "approved eleven initiatives that overturned or preempted
efforts by representative government to promote the rights or interest
of racial or other minorities."'1'1 These successful initiatives included
efforts to prevent busing to desegregate public schools, restrict illegal
immigration, ban state affirmative action, restrict efforts to protect
the rights of homosexuals, restrict bilingual education, and establish
English as the state's official language.'3 "By contrast, no voter-
approved initiatives in those states during that period expressly
expanded the rights of minorities."'" Moreover, the composition of
the electorate versus the composition of the legislature may affect the
types of laws that are passed by each body. For example, the
California electorate is two-thirds white and middle class despite the
state containing fifty percent minorities, whereas the legislature's
large number of minority-controlled legislative districts is more
reflective of the actual population.15
Initiative campaigns bring the question of minority rights and
public services into the forefront of media and public view."" Prior to
such campaigns, the public at large often has not taken much time to
think about the particular minority group or the benefits it may
receive from the state."7 "When an initiative is proposed that would
restrict or rescind rights and benefits granted.., to the group, the
campaigns in favor of and opposed to the initiative expose members
of the public to stimuli designed to sway their opinions."' ' During
101. Id.
102. SABATO, supra note 8, at 52.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 51.
106. See BOWLER, supra note 92, at 230.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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the Proposition 8 campaign, the proponents of the measure ran an
advertisement depicting a little girl coming home from school where
she had learned how a prince could marry a prince and therefore she
could marry a princess.1°9 The proponents of Proposition 8 used
education as a tactic and ploy to sway voters in favor of the
proposition and potentially altered their views of the homosexual
community. Initiative campaigns like Proposition 8 that focus on
social issues and employ propaganda, cause visceral reactions in the
electorate, happen in a short period of time, and hinder the
electorate's ability to view the issue in a more tolerant way.
Democracy is better achieved when the electorate can reach a
tolerant response; however, that requires people to ignore their initial
impulses of self-preservation and extend rights to those whom they
view as threatening and potentially destructive.
Thus, people who are on the fence about a particular issue need
time to overcome their initial impulses and fear of a particular group
in order to make a more reasoned and informed decision.
Proposition 8 was on the ballot less than six months after the
California Supreme Court rendered its decision; the electorate did
not have the luxury to have a "sober second thought" that could
potentially generate a more tolerant outcome.11
Although the effects of Proposition 8's passage on California's
gay community are still unfolding, anti-gay initiatives have often
proven to be detrimental to relationships between the gay community
and majority groups." Whether an initiative is successful or not the
''mere existence of initiatives targeting minorities can stigmatize the
group-particularly if visible elites of at least one party or ideological
group promote the intolerant position-evidence of 'learning' or
attitude change might be reflected in opinions shifting toward less
acceptance of the target group. '  A study, designed to gauge
opinion change of minority groups targeted by initiatives, determined
that GOP respondents living in states where anti-gay initiatives
circulated "were significantly less likely [than other political
affiliations] to respond favorably about tolerating different lifestyles
109. Yes on 8 in California - It Already Happened, http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=cOWjhqTrme8 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
110. BOWLER, supra note 92, at 230.
111. Id. at 229.
112. Id. at 234.
113. Id.
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and moral standards."".4  Moreover, when members of the GOP
nationally shifted to opinions less tolerant of these lifestyles during
the same time period, the effect was more substantial among voters in
states where anti-gay initiatives were filed."5 Further, "these results
are particularly interesting (and disturbing) given that some
opponents of anti-gay initiatives claim that hate crimes against gays
increased when some anti-gay initiatives appeared on state ballots.' 116
Therefore, the Proposition 8 campaign and its approval by voters may
cause conservatives' attitudes to become less tolerant toward
alternative lifestyles in California.
While no branch of government is completely innocent of
imposing laws that restrict rights of minorities, the structure of the
initiative process remains more troublesome than other constitutional
amendment processes because: 1) the proposal process does not
involve deliberation or negotiation, only a collection of signatures; 2)
once the signatures are collected, a simple majority vote can amend
the state constitution whereas the state legislature requires a two-
thirds vote plus electorate approval, and the federal constitution
requires a two-thirds vote of Congress and three-fourths vote by the
states; 3) the only institutional check on the initiative process is the
judiciary, which leaves the judiciary in a precarious position via the
electorate; and 4) initiatives tend to stigmatize the minority group
targeted by the initiative. Although the judiciary serves an important
function of protecting the rights of minorities, it is still vulnerable to
both public pressure and the public overruling the court, as was the
case with Proposition 8. The tension already present between the
electorate and the courts suggests that expanding the role of judicial
review over initiatives would not be the best way to ensure a more
deliberative process or protection of minority rights. I propose that
California reform its initiative process to provide more institutional
checks and reflection or time for a "sober second thought."
114. Id. at 243.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 245.
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VI. Alternatives to the California System
A. Switzerland
Switzerland is the birth place of initiatives.' 17 The Swiss initiative
and referendum process influenced many western states and
progressives."8 Although many proponents of direct democracy in
the United States point to the Swiss process as an exemplar system,
they fail to recognize the distinctions that developed between states
like California and the Swiss system." 9 "[T]he U.S. initiative system is
distinguished by its lack of checks on majorities, checks that are
commonplace in the Swiss initiative system, particularly at the federal
level, where the initiative power is limited to constitutional
amendments."2 '
The Swiss initiative system is indirect at both the federal and
cantonal (similar to a state in the United States) levels, and must pass
through several institutional checks before the proposed
constitutional amendment reaches the ballot. 2' These checks include:
seven Swiss citizens have 18 months to gather 100,000 signatures (a
greater hurdle than in California) for an initiative;122 a draft of the
initiative is submitted to the Federal Assembly; the Federal Assembly
determines whether the initiative is valid or if it violates any rules or
pre-existing laws; if it is valid, then the Assembly determines whether
it supports the initiative or not; if the Federal Assembly supports the
initiative, it appears on the ballot and must pass the electorate with a
double majority vote (majority of the population and majority of the
cantons must vote in favor of it); and if the Federal Assembly does
not support the valid initiative, it will place the initiative and a
counter-draft on the ballot and the electorate will vote on both
measures; the voters may approve both drafts but they must indicate
which they prefer, and the measure to receive a double-majority will
117. See ALLSWANG, supra note 42, at 3.
118. Id.
119. See ELLIS, supra note 40, at 139.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Switzerland has a population of 7,604,467. See https://www.cia.gov/library
/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sz.html In contrast, California has a population of
around 34 million and requires around 600,000 signatures. See http://censtats.census.gov/
data/CA/04006.pdf.
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be enacted into law.123 This complicated system, along with the
requirement of a double-majority vote, in theory provides a safeguard
against the tyranny of the majority.124
Apart from the institutional procedures of passing an initiative,
the Federal Assembly can also be strategic about the wording of its
voting recommendations, its choice of the Election Day, and it can
slow down the process by taking several years to consider proposals.
"In other words, delay is sometimes used as an intentional strategy to
break an initiative's momentum" or provide the public with the above
mentioned "sober second thought., 126  The ability of the Federal
Assembly to manipulate and slow down the initiative process
contrasts greatly with the system in California. The California
legislature has no power to intervene in the initiative process and no
part of the process allows for deliberation or debate between
opponents and proponents of a measure. "Furthermore, [the] fear of
the dysfunctions of what [is called] the unmediated popular vote do
not materialise [sic] in the case of Swiss popular initiatives ... due to
all mediating stages they are not as 'unmediated' as assumed, and
extreme proposals will have difficulties at the parliamentary stages."'
127
All of these safeguards and intervention on the part of the Federal
Assembly mean that the number of initiatives actually passed in
Switzerland is far smaller than the number passed in California."
The negative aspect of the Swiss system is that the political elite
can inhibit the majority's will.129 Only about one out of every ten
initiatives that even make it to the ballot are accepted by both the
people and the cantons."' Although the Swiss initiatives are generally
less successful than in California, the dialogue established between
the Swiss electorate and the Federal Assembly produce important
indirect effects.1' "[T]he existence of direct-democratic institutions
change the nature of the interaction and the power relationship
123. See MICHAEL GALLAGHER & PIER VINCENZO ULERI, THE REFERENDUM
EXPERIENCE IN EUROPE 188 (Macmillan 1996).
124. Id.
125. MAIJA SETALA, REFERENDUMS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: NORMATIVE
THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS 149 (St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1999).
126. Id.; BOWLER, supra note 92, at 229.
127. SETALA, supra note 125, at 150.
128. Id. at 149-50.
129. GALLAGHER, supra note 123, at 188.
130. Id. at 192.
131. Id. at 193.
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between political actors even in cases when they are not actively
used... the case for raising the referendum option on the political
agenda may be as important as actual referendums." '132  In
Switzerland, bargaining procedures between initiative sponsors and
the government were legally established in 1952.13' Generally,
initiative sponsors look more at making compromises with the
government in order to translate their measures into law through the
federal assembly rather than trying to garner the majority of the
vote.' This process leads to more deliberation and compromise than
the California process. Even when an initiative is not successful, the
Federal Assembly will often make concessions regarding issues
raised; for example, an initiative to disband the army barely failed in
the 1960s, but afterward the Federal Assembly did enact army
reforms.'35
Is the Swiss system an appropriate system to inspire reform for
California? There are big differences between the two entities: One
is a state and one is a country; although California is a state, its
population is much larger than Switzerland; Switzerland is less diverse
than California; and Switzerland does not have a system of judicial
review like California. Judicial review is the only institutional check
on the California initiative system, but the Swiss system has legislative
checks along with a requirement of a double majority vote.
Moreover, the Swiss Judiciary has no power to declare federal laws
void, less than eighty percent of judges are attorneys, justices are
approved and nominated by the legislature, and they serve a term of
six years.3 6 For the Swiss, the framers of the constitution are the
people, "[tlo understand why the federal courts have almost no
authority to void federal law and only limited authority to void
cantonal statutes, it is helpful to remember who may: the people. The
right to review laws, and change the constitution itself, is in use
continuously throughout Switzerland."'37  To the Swiss people,
judicial review is perceived as undemocratic.'
132. SETALA, supra note 125, at 148.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. GALLAGHER, supra note 123, at 193.
136. GREGORY A. FOSSEDAL, DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND 71
(Transaction Publishers 2005).
137. Id. at 74.
138. See id.
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Although the Swiss do not have judicial review, minority rights
are protected by other institutional safeguards. The need for judicial
review is diminished when the initiative process is tempered by
legislative review and a higher threshold of voter support through the
Swiss double majority. These two mechanisms ensure that the
initiative process involves deliberation, broad public support, and
time for the electorate to reflect on the policies that would amend the
Swiss constitution. Overall, the Swiss model represents a system
where there is an open dialogue between the electorate and the
Federal Assembly ensuring that the public is heard, but where a
simple majority cannot directly amend the constitution.
B. Massachusetts
Similar to Switzerland, Massachusetts employs an indirect
initiative process for constitutional amendments. Massachusetts'
legislature also acts as a filter for the initiative proposals; however,
unlike in Switzerland, if the initiative does not receive the support of
the legislature, the proposal will never appear on the ballot.3 9 In
order to amend the state constitution, it is necessary for an
amendment to receive the support of a quarter of the legislature (50
out of 200) at two state constitutional conventions (a joint meeting of
the House of Representatives and the Senate)." During the first
constitutional convention, the legislature may amend the initiative
amendment with a three-fourths vote, but the second convention
cannot change the amendment in any way. 141 The constitutional
conventions are held in two consecutive years and even though a
quarter of the votes of the legislature does not seem like a difficult
number to obtain, this hurdle has proven to be substantial.1 42 "Of the
dozen or so constitutional initiatives that have been presented to the
Massachusetts legislature with the requisite number of signatures,
only three have been approved by the legislature and forwarded to
the people.
14 1
Despite the low number of successful constitutional amendments
initiated by the people, similar to Switzerland, the mere presence of
the initiative process allows the people to place pressure on the
139. See ELLIS, supra note 40, at 138.
140. Id. at 137.
141. MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, § 4.
142. See ELLIS, supra note 40, at 137.
143. Id.
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legislature. '" "The most notable example was an initiative introduced
in the legislature in 1966, which called for a reduction of the
membership in the lower house from 240 to 160." 14' The initiative
passed the first constitutional convention, but failed in the second by
only one vote.146 Several years later under considerable public
pressure the legislature referred its own "House Cut" plan to the
electorate in 1974 and it was approved by eighty percent.
"Massachusetts' cumbersome amendment process meant its citizens
had to wait almost a decade to secure the desired change; on the
other hand, the system worked, even with an amendment that directly
threatened the livelihood of every state legislator.' ' 48  Striking a
balance between the United States' Federal constitutional
amendment process and California's initiative process, Massachusetts
provides its citizens with a way to influence their state constitution
while the legislature acts as a safeguard against extreme measures.
After a Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, where the court held denying gay
couples equal marriage rights was unconstitutional,49 citizens moved
to amend the state's constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage.' On
March 4, 2004, the initiative received 92 votes in favor and 105
opposed in the first constitutional convention, which allowed the
measure to proceed to the second.' During the second constitutional
amendment on September 14, 2005, the amendment failed with a vote
of 157 to 39, a stark contrast to the previous vote.152 The difference
between the two constitutional conventions reflects the change in
public attitude and that a vote in favor of same-sex marriage was
more politically acceptable.'53 Senator Brian P. Lees, the Republican
144. See ELLIS, supra note 40, at 137.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 138.
149. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
150. Rachel Lewis, After Vote, Both Sides in Debate Energized, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
15, 2005, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/09/15/
aftervotebothsides in debateenergized/.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Rejects Bill to Eliminate Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A-14, available at http://www.nytimes.com2005/09/15/national/
15amendment.html?ex=1284436800&en=2fcd2de4099e5435&ei=5090&partner=rssuserlan
d&emc=rss.
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minority leader who voted for the amendment during the first
constitutional convention, stated after the second:
[T]oday gay marriage is the law of the land... voting for the
amendment.., would mean taking action against our friends
and neighbors who today are currently enjoying the benefits of
marriage ... gay marriage has begun and life has not changed
for the citizens of the commonwealth, with the exception of
those who can now marry who could not before.5
Therefore, the Massachusetts system gave people and legislators
an opportunity for a "sober second thought" and generated an
outcome that protected the rights of a minority group.
VII. Recommended Reforms to the California Initiative
Process
I suggest the following reforms would improve California's
current constitutional amendment initiative system: California's
signature requirement can remain the same, but instead of the
Secretary of State waiting only 131 days before placing the measure
on the ballot, the measure, like in Switzerland and Massachusetts,
should be submitted immediately to the legislature. Once before the
legislature, the Massachusetts model should be followed by requiring
the proposed amendment to receive support of a quarter of the
legislature (40 out of 120)... at two state constitutional conventions,
which would be simply a joint meeting of the California Assembly
and Senate in two consecutive years. This institutional safeguard
would allow the legislature to debate the merits of the amendment on
two separate occasions and allow the legislatures to gauge public
support over the course of two years. Similar to the Massachusetts
system, if the initiative does not pass the two constitutional
conventions, the measure does not go to the ballot.
If the initiative amendment makes it to the ballot, I propose
California adopt Switzerland's system at this point in the process,
which allows the legislature to provide the electorate with a
countermeasure that addresses the problems still apparent with the
proposed amendment. In addition, the double-majority vote or an
increase in vote total, like the Swiss system should be implemented.
154. Id.
155. See WILSON & EBBERT, supra note 67, at 84.
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If California applied a double-majority vote, it would require a
majority of the entire electorate and a majority of all the counties'
vote totals; however, California could use a super majority vote (two-
thirds vote of the electorate) requirement to avoid the difficulties,
due to the size of the state and number of counties, in determining the
vote distribution of every county. Judicial review would remain in
place for challenges to both proposed and passed initiatives.
Conclusion
In California, judicial review plays an important role as the
institutional check on the initiative system. Despite the California
Supreme Court's indispensable role as protector of minority rights,
the struggle between the electorate and the court to settle on a
definition of marriage highlights how the court should not be the only
institutional actor checking the electorate. Moreover, the court
should not be the first and last check when the electorate is seeking to
amend the state constitution. In general, to amend a constitution
there are many steps in the process to ensure amendments reflect
both deep public support and deliberation. The California
constitutional amendment initiative process lacks safeguards to
protect the state constitution and minority groups from the whims of
the majority. The California constitutional amendment initiative
process should incorporate institutional checks from both the
Massachusetts' and Switzerland's processes.
Proposition 8 is a quintessential example of how the initiative
system allowed the electorate to amend the constitution without
deliberation or safeguards in place to protect the interests of a
minority group. The purposes of my proposed reforms are to
guarantee that multiple institutional actors are assessing the benefits
and negative effects of the proposed amendments, both institutional
actors and the electorate are given time to reflect on the impact the
measure will have on all people in the state. Moreover, the reforms
would ensure that the state constitution is not constantly being
amended by a majority who might simply have an initial visceral
reaction to a particular social behavior or marginalized group.
California should still have a process where the electorate is heard,
but the process should provide institutional checks to ensure that a
majority of the vote cannot tyrannize a minority group. Tolerance
needs time for a "sober second thought."
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